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We study price competition in the presence of search costs and product differentiation.
The limit cases of the model are the ‘‘Bertrand Paradox,’’ the ‘‘Diamond Paradox,’’
and Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Market prices rise with search costs and
decrease with the number of ﬁrms. Prices may initially fall with the degree of product
differentiation because more diversity leads to more search and hence more competi-
tion. Equilibrium diversity rises with search costs, while the optimum level falls, so
entry is excessive. The market failure is most pronounced for low preference for variety
and high search costs.
1. Introduction
n Why do consumers shop around before buying? One reason is to ﬁnd a low price.
Another is to ﬁnd a product they like. There are many industries in which buyer search
is an important feature of market interaction. Shopping for shoes is one example;
another is a business that must decide between competing suppliers (e.g., builders
choosing where to buy inputs). One would expect lower search costs to lead buyers to
search more options before purchasing and hence lead to lower prices. Likewise, stan-
dard economic intuition suggests that prices would be lower if there were more ﬁrms
because consumers can search across more options.
The consequences of buyer search on market performance are potentially severe.
Diamond (1971) provides an extreme example, in what has been called the Diamond
Paradox. There are two parts to the paradox. First, in Diamond’s model the only equi-
librium is for all ﬁrms to set the monopoly price regardless of the number of ﬁrms and
the level of search costs (as long as these costs are positive). Second, in equilibrium,
buyers do not search. The idea is loosely the following. Suppose there were an equi-
librium at which some ﬁrm set a price below the monopoly price and (weakly) below
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those set by all other ﬁrms. Then all consumers who go to the low-price ﬁrm would
still buy there even if the ﬁrm raised its price by an amount less than the cost of
searching another ﬁrm, since a consumer who searched again could not expect to gain
enough to offset the search cost. This incentive to raise price means that all ﬁrms must
charge the monopoly price in equilibrium. Since buyers rationally anticipate that the
same price is charged by all ﬁrms in equilibrium, they have no reason to search. Hence
this is a search model without search, and there is a large discontinuity between the
market solution with search costs and the market outcomes traditionally analyzed by
economists. In particular, the Bertrand (1883) model (where consumers are perfectly
informed about prices) predicts marginal cost pricing independently of the number of
ﬁrms. This latter result, which is also counter to common sense, has been termed the
Bertrand Paradox (Tirole, 1988).
The only motive a consumer has to search in the Diamond model is to ﬁnd a
better price. As in the Bertrand analysis, products sold by different ﬁrms are implicitly
assumed to be homogeneous, so that buyers know exactly what their consumer surplus
is. This framework does not account for consumers searching for a product they like.
To capture this idea, it is necessary to introduce heterogeneity across products. This
article considers the effects of product heterogeneity on the performance of markets
with consumer search costs.
The effects of product heterogeneity per se on market performance were described
by Chamberlin (1933). He argued that prices would exceed marginal cost because ﬁrms
have some market power even when there are many of them. Chamberlin’s argument
has since been investigated rigorously by many subsequent authors, in various frame-
works. The one closest to our own is the model of Perloff and Salop (1985), which
looks at monopolistic competition as the limit, as the number of ﬁrms gets large, of
price competition in oligopoly with a discrete-choice model of differentiated products.
These authors found that prices in the limit would exceed marginal cost only under
some speciﬁcations of taste heterogeneity that they and other authors have found to be
rather stringent.1 This development led other authors to search for models that would
generate ‘‘true’’ monopolistic competition. Most pertinent to our study is Wolinsky
(1986). Wolinsky proposed an adroit model that appends consumer search to the Per-
loff-Salop framework and showed that price necessarily exceeds marginal cost in the
limit of an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms. Wolinsky also notes (1986) that the mechanism
driving this result is different from the Diamond Paradox: in his model the limit price
rises with search costs. We shall show here that the Wolinsky model yields the Diamond
model as a special case—a feature Wolinsky overlooked—as well as generating such
other models as standard Bertrand competition and the Perloff-Salop model as other
special cases. The general model provides a rich framework that yields intuitive com-
parative statics results: the equilibrium price rises with search costs and falls with the
number of ﬁrms. These comparative statics results constitute the building blocks for
our major results, which address the effects of increased taste for variety on the equi-
librium price and the comparison between equilibrium and optimum diversity.
In models of product differentiation without consumer search, equilibrium prices
typically rise with the degree of consumer taste for diversity (see Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse (1992) and references therein). This is because greater taste for diversity
imparts more market power through more intense preferences. The picture changes
dramatically when there are consumer search costs. With low preference for diversity,
the Diamond result prevails, since consumers have no incentive to search. As the
1 Speciﬁcally, this result holds if the support of consumer tastes is inﬁnite and the tails are not too thin,
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preference for diversity rises, some consumers will check out other ﬁrms if the product
at the ﬁrst ﬁrm sampled is not to their liking. This means that some consumers will
actively search, bringing ﬁrms into direct competition, which in turn induces a lower
equilibrium price. The greater the taste for variety, the more consumers search, and
this intensiﬁed search activity increases the scope of competition. However, once taste
for variety is high enough so that a sufﬁcient number of consumers search, the situation
is close to the case of perfectly informed consumers, and thereafter the equilibrium
price rises with taste for variety for the standard reason. The argument above suggests
that the equilibrium price should fall and then rise with taste for variety. We shall make
clear in this article the conditions under which this intuition holds.
The other main contribution by Chamberlin was a discussion of equilibrium prod-
uct diversity as compared to the optimal level, with Chamberlin suggesting that the
outcome was ‘‘a sort of ideal.’’ We show that markets in which search costs are im-
portant may be particularly prone to excessive entry of ﬁrms in equilibrium, and the
greater the search cost, the greater the extent of the market failure. This is essentially
because higher search costs raise proﬁts and attract entry, while the social optimum
stipulates that fewer ﬁrms should serve the market when search costs are higher.
Section 2 presents the basic model and gives the conditions under which the Di-
amond Paradox arises. Section 3 discusses the comparative statics properties of the
model and the limit cases of Bertrand, Diamond, and Chamberlin. In Section 4 we
consider the effects of taste for product diversity on equilibrium price, with emphasis
on its nonmonotonicity. Section 5 establishes the excess-entry result. Results are
summed up in Section 6, which also provides a discussion of how the present analysis
applies to actual market situations.
2. The model
n There are n single-product ﬁrms, for which marginal production costs are zero.
There is a population of L consumers. Each consumer , 5 1 ,...,L has tastes described
by a conditional utility function (net of any search cost) of the form
u,i(pi) 52 pi 1 me,i i 5 1 ,...,n (1)
if she buys product i at price pi. The parameter m . 0 is a scale parameter that captures
the heterogeneity of consumer tastes and e,i is the realization of a random variable with
distribution F and a continuously differentiable density f whose support is an interval
[a, b] of the extended real line. The term me,i can be interpreted as a match value
between consumer , and product i, and these match values are assumed to be inde-
pendent across consumers and products.
A consumer must incur a search cost c in order to learn the price charged by any
particular ﬁrm as well as her match value for the product sold by that ﬁrm. Consumers
search sequentially with costless recall. The utility of consumer , 5 1 ,...,L is given by
u,i(pi) 2 kc,
if she buys product i at price pi after visiting k ﬁrms. We only consider equilibria at
which all ﬁrms charge the same price p*. Thus a consumer expects all the ﬁrms that
she has not yet visited to charge p*.2
2 In Anderson and Renault (forthcoming) we consider a duopoly version of the model to determine
how the degree of consumer information affects equilibrium prices. We show that informed consumers impart
a negative externality on uninformed ones, implying that the extent of investment in information may be too
small.722 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
q RAND 1999.
Suppose that a consumer holds a best offer with utility u,j(pj) (note that we allow pj
to differ from p* in order to account for pricing off the equilibrium path). If the consumer
samples another ﬁrm, ﬁrm i, at which she expects price p*, she will prefer to buy its
product if 2p* 1 me,i exceeds 2pj 1 me,j, i.e., if e,i exceeds x [ e,j 1 (p* 2 pj)/m.I n
that case the added utility is pj 2 p* 1 m(e,i 2 e,j) 5 m(e,i 2 x). Hence the expected
incremental utility from searching one more ﬁrm is
`
mg(x) 5 m (e 2 x)f(e) de. (2) E
x
It can be easily veriﬁed that g is strictly decreasing on (2`, b] and goes from 1` to
zero as x goes from 2` to b. Since m . 0, the expected incremental utility from a single
search exceeds the search cost if and only if x , x ˆ, where x ˆ is uniquely deﬁned by
c
g(x ˆ) 5 . (3)
m
If a single extra search yields a positive expected net beneﬁt (i.e., if x , x ˆ), then
the consumer will clearly wish to search at least one more time if she has the option
of further searches afterward. On the other hand, if a single extra search yields a
negative expected net beneﬁt (i.e., if x . x ˆ), then with the option of further searches,
the net expected beneﬁt from searching would still be negative. To see this, suppose
that the stopping rule described above (searching if and only if x , x ˆ) is optimal when
there are t ﬁrms left to search, and this is clearly true for t 5 1. Consider now t 1 1
remaining ﬁrms. If x . x ˆ and the consumer does search one more ﬁrm, then either a
smaller value of x is revealed or a larger value of x is revealed. In any case, the best
offer she holds corresponds to an x larger than x ˆ. Since there are only t ﬁrms left to
search and it was assumed that the stopping rule is optimal, the consumer would then
stop searching. Thus, when there are t 1 1 ﬁrms left and x exceeds x ˆ, the consumer
knows she would never search more than one additional ﬁrm, and since this yields a
negative net beneﬁt, she would rather not search at all. Hence if the stopping rule is
optimal with t ﬁrms left, it is optimal with t 1 1 ﬁrms left, for any t. Since it is optimal
for t 5 1, it is optimal for any t by induction.3
The reservation value x ˆ determines the probability that any given consumer goes
on searching after visiting a ﬁrm. The larger it is, the more likely it is that she continues.
Since g is strictly decreasing, x ˆ is a strictly decreasing function of the ratio c/m, and it
goes from b to 2` as c/m goes from zero to 1`. Thus the probability that a consumer
stops her search at any ﬁrm i charging price pi is an increasing function of the search
cost and a decreasing function of product diversity measured by m. Note that x ˆ cannot
exceed the upper bound, b, of the support of f. It equals b if and only if c 5 0: this
corresponds to a situation in which (since search is costless) no consumer would make
her purchase until she has searched all the ﬁrms.
The reservation value can, however, be less than the lower bound, a, of the support
of f.Then we have mg(x ˆ) 5 m(Ee 2 x ˆ) . m(Ee 2 a). Using (3), this implies that
c . m(Ee 2 a), (4)
3 See Kohn and Shavell (1974) for a more formal argument.ANDERSON AND RENAULT / 723
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which means that if a consumer expects all the ﬁrms to charge the same price, the
expected incremental utility from further searches is less than the search cost, even if
her current best offer involves the worst possible match. Then the only motive for
search would be the expectation that subsequent ﬁrms charge prices lower than those
already observed. In that sense, this situation is very similar to that analyzed by Dia-
mond (1971): whatever the price charged by its competitors, some ﬁrm can increase
its price (by some amount less than c 2 m(Ee 2 a)) without losing any customer. Hence
if the search cost, c, is large enough, or if the taste for variety, m, is small enough (so
that (4) holds), then the only equilibrium is that all ﬁrms set inﬁnite prices, which is
the analogue to the Diamond result in our context.4 In the next section we analyze the
more interesting case in which some consumers search in equilibrium.
3. Market equilibrium
n Suppose all ﬁrms but ﬁrm i set price p*. Then it is optimal for consumers, when
sampling ﬁrm i, to use the search rule described in the previous section. Thus the
probability of a consumer staying with ﬁrm i, given that i is sampled, is
Pr(x . x ˆ) 5 1 2 F(x ˆ 1D ),
where D[(pi 2 p*)/m is the standardized price premium of ﬁrm i. Firm i is sampled
ﬁrst with probability 1/n, second with probability F(x ˆ)/n (since when another ﬁrm is
sampled ﬁrst, it is accepted with probability 1 2 F(x ˆ)), third with probability F(x ˆ)2/n,
etc. A consumer also purchases from ﬁrm i if she samples all the ﬁrms and i yields
the highest utility. Then ﬁrm i’s demand is the sum of the series that represents con-
sumers who stop once they reach i plus the ‘‘comebacks’’ who sample all ﬁrms and
then return to i:
ˆ x1D n L 1 2 F(x ˆ)
n21 D(p , p*) 5 [1 2 F(x ˆ 1D )] 1 LF (e 2D ) f(e) de. (5) i E [] n 1 2 F(x ˆ) 2`
Assuming that x ˆ Î [a, b], we now turn to the characterization of equilibria in
which all ﬁrms charge the same price. Note that D(p*, p*) 5 L/n. The derivative of
ﬁrm i’s demand with respect to pi, evaluated at pi 5 p*, is
ˆ x n ]DL f (x ˆ)12 F(x ˆ)
n212 n22 (p*, p*) 52 1 f(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 2 (n 2 1)f(e) F(e) de . (6) E [] ]p m n 1 2 F(x ˆ) i 2`
The last two terms in the bracket can be written together as f9(e)F(e)n21 de. Hence
ˆ x #2`
the symmetric equilibrium price is5
2D(p*, p*) m
p* 55 . (7) ˆ x n ]D 1 2 F(x ˆ)
n21 (p*, p*) f(x ˆ) 2 nf 9(e)F(e) de E ]p 1 2 F(x ˆ) i 2`
The following proposition, proved in Appendix A, provides some comparative
4 One can readily introduce ﬁnite reservation prices (see Anderson and Renault, forthcoming) to cap
the inﬁnite price equilibrium; we chose not to do so here to avoid a taxonomy that would detract from the
main points.
5 The ﬁrst two terms in the bracket in (6) can be written together as 2f(x ˆ)/n [F(x ˆ)k 2 F(x ˆ)n21],
n21 ok50
which is negative. Thus []D/]pi](p*, p*) is negative and, from (7), p* is nonnegative.724 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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statics results for this candidate equilibrium price under the assumption that 1 2 F is
logconcave on [a, b]. Logconcavity of 1 2 F, which is equivalent to an increasing
hazard rate, is implied by logconcavity of f.We use logconcavity of f in Section 5 to
show that the market always provides excessive variety. The logconcavity property,
which means that the log of the function is concave, is weaker than concavity but
stronger than quasi-concavity, and it holds for many common densities (see Caplin and
Nalebuff (1991) for a list). It amounts to the density being well behaved.
Proposition 1. If 1 2 F is logconcave on [a, b], and c , m(Ee 2 a), p* is an increasing
function of the search cost, c, and a decreasing function of the number of ﬁrms, n.
Furthermore,
m
lim p* 5 (8) 1`
c®0
2 n22 n(n 2 1) f(e) F(e) de E
2`
m[1 2 F(x ˆ)]
lim p* 5 . (9)
f(x ˆ) n®1`
The proposition highlights how the introduction of product differentiation (via m)
smooths out the economic analysis of markets with search costs. It is intuitive that
higher search costs should lead to higher prices and that if the cost of gathering infor-
mation is nearly zero, the market outcome should be close to what would prevail if
consumers were perfectly informed about prices and match values. The proposition
says that this is what happens if there is enough heterogeneity in products (m large
enough so that (4) does not hold). In particular, the limit in (8) is the symmetric
equilibrium price of the Perloff-Salop model where consumers are perfectly informed.
This limit is attained smoothly as search costs go to zero. As we pointed out at the
end of Section 2, if (4) holds, the situation is the analogue of the Diamond paradox.
This does not happen for c small, but rather, for c large enough where the threshold
value of search costs increases as product differentiation increases. Note that this sit-
uation actually never happens if the distribution of match values is unbounded from
below (i.e., if a is minus inﬁnity). Whether the Bertrand outcome may be obtained as
a limit of this model depends on the order in which the limits are taken. Indeed, the
Bertrand equilibrium price of zero (which is marginal cost by assumption) is obtained
if the search cost, c, is taken to zero ﬁrst and then the heterogeneity parameter, m,i s
taken to zero. This is because taking c to zero with m positive yields the Perloff-Salop
equilibrium price (8) and then, taking m to zero, yields marginal cost. On the other
hand, as discussed in more detail in the next section, if m is taken to zero ﬁrst (for a
given c), the price becomes inﬁnite and would thus never reach zero if c is in turn
taken to zero.
The other intuitive property given in the proposition is that the market price falls
with the number of ﬁrms in the market. This is in contrast to both the Bertrand and
Diamond cases, in which the price is unaffected by n. In the limit as the number of
ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity, as pointed out by Wolinsky (1986), the markup is positive, and
this feature supports Wolinsky’s claim to have proposed a model of ‘‘true’’ monopolistic
competition. But for this phenomenon to be signiﬁcant, it is crucial that search costs
are not too small. To see this, suppose that we take c to zero in (9).6 Then the equilib-
rium price tends to zero with the search cost if and only if
6 It is easy to check that if 1 2 F is logconcave, then the equilibrium price given by (9) is increasing
in c.ANDERSON AND RENAULT / 725
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[1 2 F(x)]
lim 5 0. (10)
f(x) x®b
So for the Chamberlinian monopolistic competition markup to be signiﬁcant for low
search costs, it is necessary that (10) does not hold. It clearly holds if f(b) . 0. If
f(b) 5 0, then we can apply L’Ho ˆpital’s rule, since 1 2 F(b) 5 0, and so the limit
price is then zero if and only if
2f(x)
lim 5 0. (11)
f9(x) x®b
Considering (10) in conjunction with (11) shows there is a markup in the limit as both
the number of ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity and the search cost goes to zero under the (rather
restrictive) condition that the support of the taste density has a thick enough upper tail.
This condition on the density is the same as that found by Perloff and Salop to guar-
antee that the symmetric equilibrium price in their oligopoly model (without search)
would go to zero as the number of ﬁrms becomes inﬁnite. This equivalence is scarcely
surprising, since the equilibrium price in their model is the limit of the price in ours
as c goes to zero (and is given by (8)). In that sense, their result stems from taking c
to zero and then n to inﬁnity, whereas we have taken the limits in the reverse sequence.
The issue of existence of equilibrium is not our central concern and is discussed
in some detail in Appendix B. There we show that equilibrium exists under monopo-
listic competition (with an inﬁnite number of sellers). Furthermore, equilibrium can be
shown to exist under oligopoly for any ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, if f is logconcave and
nondecreasing on [a, b] as well as for several other categories of distributions.
4. The effect of increased product diversity on prices
n An increase in m corresponds to an increase in product diversity because a higher
m means an increase in the variance of the match value between a consumer and a
product. In the absence of search costs, as in Perloff and Salop (1985), an increase in
product diversity would unambiguously raise prices (see (8)). This reﬂects the increase
in market power of ﬁrms due to more intense preferences. In the setting of this article,
however, since consumers must incur a cost to ﬁnd out about product characteristics,
an increase in product diversity implies more search by consumers trying to ﬁnd better
matches, which brings ﬁrms into more intense competition. This latter effect may cause
a drop in the market price when product diversity is increased.
First, (7) shows that a change in m affects p* directly, as well as indirectly through
x ˆ. The direct affect is unambiguously positive. This is due to the increase in the ﬁrms’
market power, keeping search behavior constant. On the other hand, it was shown in
the proof of Proposition 1 that if 1 2 F is logconcave on [a, b], p* is decreasing in x ˆ.
Since x ˆ is increasing in m, the indirect effect of an increase in product diversity on the
market price is negative. This is because more heterogeneity among ﬁrms leads to more
search activity by consumers. As we show below, the effect of an increase in m on p*
can be either positive or negative, depending on which effect dominates.
At the end of Section 2, it was pointed out that if (4) holds, we are in the Diamond
case for which price is inﬁnite. This will happen if m is sufﬁciently small, more spe-
ciﬁcally if m , m0, where m0 is deﬁned from (4) as c/(Ee 2 a). The following propo-
sition sums up some sufﬁcient conditions under which the effect of an increased
heterogeneity on price is unambiguous provided that m . m0.726 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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Proposition 2. Suppose f is logconcave on [a, b] and m . m0. Then
(i) For m sufﬁciently large, p* is increasing in m.
(ii) On any interval such that f9(x ˆ) # 0, p* is increasing in m.
(iii) If f(a) 5 0 and f9(a) . 0, then p* is decreasing in m on some interval
(m0, m0 1 d) with d . 0.
Proof. Using the deﬁnition of x ˆ . a from (3) (i.e., m 5 c/g(x ˆ)), the reciprocal of the
equilibrium price can be written from (7) as




ˆ x n 1 2 F(x ˆ)
n212 n22 k(x ˆ) 5 f(x ˆ) 2 nf(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 1 n(n 2 1) f(e) F(e) de E [] 1 2 F(x ˆ) 2`
is just the denominator of (7). From (12) it is clear that the equilibrium price is in-
creasing (decreasing) in m if and only if the product gk is decreasing (increasing) in x ˆ.
First note that logconcavity of g (which follows from the fact that g is the integral
of the logconcave function 1 2 F, which follows from integrating (2) by parts) implies
that g/(1 2 F) is decreasing.7 Thus (from (12)) price will be increasing as long as
k(1 2 F) is decreasing in x ˆ or
ˆ x
nn 212 n22 [1 2 F(x ˆ)] f9(x ˆ) 2 [1 2 F(x ˆ)]nf9(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 2 n(n 2 1)f(x ˆ) f(e) F(e) de # 0. E
2`
(13)
This inequality holds for x ˆ close enough to b, so price must be increasing for m suf-
ﬁciently large, which proves (i). Equation (13) may also be used to show that (ii) holds.
The sum of the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of (13) has the same sign as
f9(x ˆ).8 Hence the equilibrium price is always increasing with m whenever f9(x ˆ) # 0.
To determine whether price slopes down over some interval to the right of m0,w e
differentiate (12) above and evaluate it at x ˆ 5 a to yield
d(1/p*)
2 sgn (a) 5 sgn[[f(a) 1 f9(a)](Ee 2 a) 2 f(a)].
dx ˆ
If f(a) 5 0 and f9(a) . 0, price is therefore falling at ﬁrst. Q.E.D.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 deal with cases where price increases with product
heterogeneity. In particular, from condition (i), this happens for sufﬁciently high levels
of product heterogeneity. This is because almost every consumer searches all ﬁrms so
that the intuition from the Perloff-Salop case applies. When the density of match values
is not monotonically increasing, condition (ii) provides a lower bound on product het-
erogeneity that ensures price is increasing. Since logconcavity of f implies f9 cannot
turn positive after it is negative, there is a minimal m beyond which f9 is negative so
7 This follows since g logconcave implies that g9/g is decreasing, and g952 (1 2 F).
8 The two terms can be written together as f9(x ˆ)(1 2 F(x ˆ)) [F(x ˆ)k 2 F(x ˆ)n], and the result follows
n21 ok50
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that price increases thereafter with m. In particular, price increases with m for all m . m0
when f9(a) # 0.
On the other hand, for low levels of product heterogeneity (i.e., for m in the
neighborhood of m0), price is necessarily decreasing in m. Since price is inﬁnite for
m , m0 and ﬁnite for m . m0, there is clearly a drop at m0. The way this drop actually
occurs and the behavior of the price at m0 depend on the characteristics of f at a. To
determine the behavior of the equilibrium price as m tends to m0 from above, we take
the limit as x ˆ tends to a in (12) to give
c
lim p* 5 ,
(Ee 2 a)f(a) x ˆ®a
where we have used g(a) 5 Ee 2 a. Hence if f(a) is zero and Ee is ﬁnite, p* goes to
inﬁnity as m falls to its lowest value compatible with search activity by consumers (m0),9
and therefore price must initially fall with m.I ff(a) is not zero, the limit price is ﬁnite,
and any price above that limit is an equilibrium price for m 5 m0. Since consumers do not
search, any price decrease will gain no consumers, but a price increase will lose consumers
at a rate so fast that this is not proﬁtable if the price exceeds the limit one.10
The conditions of Proposition 2 (iii) ensure that an increased heterogeneity causes
a smooth drop in price for values of m to the right of m0. For instance, these conditions
hold if the distribution function is a power function, F(x) 5 xg,1, g , 2 (the ﬁrst
inequality being strict ensures a zero density at zero, while the second inequality en-
sures a strictly positive derivative of the density at zero), with support [0, 1]. The
condition given in the proof can also be used to show that p* is sloping down on some
neighborhood to the right of m0 if f is logconcave and symmetric on its support [0, 1]
with f(0) small enough.
We have shown that the price starts by falling as product heterogeneity increases
for low values of m. Furthermore, it necessarily slopes up eventually as m becomes
large enough. We would expect that in many examples, the general shape is quasi-
convex, with the price falling at ﬁrst and then going up. This intuition is borne out in
the case of monopolistic competition. Indeed, the equilibrium price is logconvex in x ˆ
(and hence quasi-convex in m) under the additional assumption that the hazard rate is
logconcave. This is easily seen using logconcavity of g and taking the log of the right-
hand side of (9), which is convex if the hazard rate is logconcave. For example, the
logistic is a logconcave density that satisﬁes this property. Another example for which
the equilibrium price exhibits a clear U-shape is for the distribution F(x) 5 exp[x],
with xe (2`, 0). Here g(x ˆ) 5 exp[x ˆ] 2 x ˆ 2 1, and the price derivative with respect to
x ˆ has the sign of exp[2x ˆ] 2 3 exp[x ˆ] 1 x ˆ 1 2. This latter function is ﬁrst negative and
then positive. The intuition for the U-shape is as follows. For low m, there is very little
consumer search and so very little competition among ﬁrms. As m rises, consumers
search more to get better matches, bringing more competition between ﬁrms for the
itinerant consumers. However, past a point, enough consumers search so that the usual
effect of higher taste heterogeneity kicks in, and the equilibrium price rises because of
higher taste for particular products.
9 The assumption that Ee is ﬁnite takes care of the case a 52 ` .
10 Note that m0 5 0 for c 5 0. Then, as a special case, we have the result that (for no product differentiation
and zero search costs), if consumers are imperfectly informed about prices, there is a range of equilibrium prices
between marginal cost and the monopoly price. This point was suggested to us by Dale Stahl.728 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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5. The optimum number of ﬁrms
n Recent results comparing the equilibrium and optimum number of ﬁrms under mo-
nopolistic competition (and without search costs) suggest that the market system may
tend to overprovide diversity, but not by much. For Chamberlinian models (with iden-
tically and independently distributed preferences, so that Chamberlin’s symmetry as-
sumption is veriﬁed), Deneckere and Rothschild (1992) show that the ratio of equilibrium
to optimal numbers of ﬁrms tends to one as entry costs go to zero. Anderson, de Palma,
and Nesterov (1995) show there is always overentry under oligopoly (for f logconcave),
although the extent of overentry is frequently small: the largest degree of overentry found
for monopolistic competition is 10%. Since the present article has the model of the latter
article as a limit case when c goes to zero (Proposition 1), we can use their results to
analyze the question of equilibrium versus optimal provision. The method we use affords
a clear answer. Speciﬁcally, Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium prices increase with c
and decrease with n. Since gross proﬁt per ﬁrm is just p*/n, the latter property implies
that gross proﬁts decrease with the number of ﬁrms, so there is a unique long-run equi-
librium (at which gross proﬁt equals the entry cost, K). The former property implies that
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms rises with search costs because higher friction in the
market facilitates higher prices. Intuitively, we would expect the optimal number of ﬁrms
to be a decreasing function of c, because higher c implies less search activity so that
there is less beneﬁt to having many ﬁrms. We show that this property indeed holds. Thus
the overentry found by Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) is exacerbated by the
introduction of search costs, and we have the following:
Proposition 3. For f logconcave, there are too many ﬁrms in the symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. The social beneﬁt of an additional ﬁrm (ﬁrm n 1 1) is the increase in surplus
associated with it (given the optimal search behavior of consumers) minus the lump-
sum cost, K, of setting up a new ﬁrm. Given that preferences are identically and
independently distributed, the order of consumer search is irrelevant. For the social
problem we can therefore assume, without loss of generality (and to simplify the der-
ivation) that the added ﬁrm is searched last. Thus under the stopping rule (3) there are
LF(x ˆ)n consumers who end up searching ﬁrm n 1 1. The extra search costs are LcF(x ˆ)n.
The consumers who search ﬁrm n 1 1 are those who would return to an earlier ﬁrm
if there were only n ﬁrms, because they did not ﬁnd an acceptable match (i.e., ei , x ˆ
for all i 5 1 ,...,n). The expected utility from returning after n searches is
ˆ x
n21 mnL ef(e)F(e) de. E
2`
With the additional (n 1 1)th ﬁrm, a fraction 1 2 F(x ˆ) of these consumers ﬁnd en11 . x ˆ,
with associated beneﬁt mL ef(e) de.
` # ˆ x
The others still return (possibly to ﬁrm n 1 1), and the expected beneﬁt on this
account is
ˆ x
n m(n 1 1)L ef(e)F(e) de. E
2`
The net surplus gain from the (n 1 1)th ﬁrm is thereforeANDERSON AND RENAULT / 729
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ˆ ` x
nn n DW 52 LcF(x ˆ) 1 mLF(x ˆ) ef(e) de 1 mL(n 1 1) ef(e)F(e) de EE
ˆ x 2`
ˆ x
n21 2 mLn ef(e)F(e) de 2 K. E
2`
Integrating by parts, we have
ˆ ` x DWc




Recalling that, from (3), ef(e) de 2 x ˆ[1 2 F(x ˆ)] 5 c/m, this simpliﬁes to
` # ˆ x
ˆ x DWK
n 5 F(e)[ 12 F(e)] de 2 . (14) E Lm Lm 2`
The optimal number of ﬁrms is found by setting this last expression equal to zero:
since the right-hand side is decreasing in n and increasing in x ˆ, the optimal number of
ﬁrms, n*, is increasing in x ˆ. By extension, n*i sdecreasing in c. By Proposition 1,
however, the equilibrium number is increasing in c. This means that there is necessarily
overentry in equilibrium if there is not underentry for the model with c 5 0. This latter
property has been proved in Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) for f logcon-
cave. Q.E.D.
Wolinsky (1984) obtains a similar overentry result by introducing search costs in
the circle model of Salop (1979). In Wolinsky’s model the socially optimal number of
ﬁrms is bounded above because of the search behavior of consumers (this bound being
decreasing in the search cost). Then if the lump-sum cost of setting up a new ﬁrm, K,
is small enough so that the number of ﬁrms in equilibrium is large enough, there is
overentry. The reasoning behind Proposition 3 does not depend on there being an upper
bound on the optimal number of ﬁrms. Indeed, as K goes to zero, for the integral in
(14) to go to zero it is necessary that n goes to inﬁnity, so there is no upper bound.
An important difference between the two models is that in Wolinsky’s model, if n is
sufﬁciently large, all consumers ﬁnd a brand that satisﬁes the sequential search stopping
rule. Then the expected social beneﬁt of an extra brand is zero, since the expected
surplus of a consumer is the average surplus from a brand satisfying the stopping rule,
the value of which is not affected by the number of ﬁrms. In our model, the beneﬁt
from an extra brand is that obtained by those consumers who buy the best brand they
could ﬁnd after searching all the ﬁrms. Adding an extra ﬁrm increases the expected
surplus from that best brand (as in the model without search costs).
The analysis that leads to Proposition 3 stresses that an increase in consumer search
costs exacerbates overentry. While higher search costs increase the equilibrium number
of ﬁrms by raising proﬁts, higher costs reduce the optimal number of ﬁrms because
consumers search less and then beneﬁt less from added variety. As an extreme example,
consider the case where the Diamond Paradox holds (i.e., (4) holds and x ˆ # a). There
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is inﬁnite for any level of entry cost, whereas the
optimal number of ﬁrms is one since the right-hand side of (14) is always negative.730 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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These results highlight the fact that markets can perform very inefﬁciently in the pres-
ence of search costs.
6. Conclusion
n Bertrand (1883) argued that price would be driven down to marginal cost even
with only two ﬁrms in the market (although, as noted by Ekelund and Hebert (1990),
Bertrand (1883) was not the ﬁrst writer to think about an equilibrium in prices; the
credit should go to Fauveau (1867)).11 This result was termed the ‘‘Bertrand Paradox’’
by Tirole (1988). Chamberlin (1933), by introducing product differentiation, argued
that price will exceed marginal cost even when there are many ﬁrms. Thus product
differentiation resolves the Bertrand Paradox. Diamond (1971) argued that ﬁrms would
set monopoly prices in the Bertrand context (i.e., with homogeneous products) if con-
sumers face search costs, even arbitrarily small ones. Moreover, there is no search in
equilibrium, since consumers rationally expect the same price to prevail at each ﬁrm
and so have no reason to search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm encountered. In this article we
have elaborated upon how product differentiation resolves the ‘‘Diamond Paradox.’’
Indeed, as long as products are differentiated, prices fall as search costs fall and de-
crease as the number of ﬁrms rises; furthermore, consumers search in equilibrium.
Diamond’s prediction appears as a limit case when there is too little product differen-
tiation or when search costs are too high. The cases of Chamberlinian and Bertrand
competition also arise as limit cases of the present model: the former when the number
of ﬁrms gets large, and the latter when search costs and product heterogeneity go to
zero.
The model also has interesting comparative static properties with respect to the
degree of product heterogeneity. In a standard model with perfectly informed consum-
ers, market prices typically rise with the degree of product differentiation. But once
we introduce consumer search costs, prices may fall with taste diversity, because more
diversity engenders more search and hence more competition. This effect leads to
perverse market incentives. In particular, a higher preference for variety may lead to a
smaller range of products, although the social optimum prescribes a wider range. Nev-
ertheless, since the equilibrium diversity rises with search costs while the optimal level
falls, there is always excessive entry. The extent of the market failure is most pro-
nounced for low preference for variety and for high search costs.
Actual market situations with high prices seem particularly puzzling when there
is little product differentiation. Furthermore, if there are also many ﬁrms, it is hard to
argue that the high observed prices arise from collusion among ﬁrms. ‘‘Tourist traps’’
(e.g., souvenir shops in Lourdes, Greek restaurants on the Paris Left Bank, seafood
restaurants in the rue des Bouchers in Brussels, and countless others) provide a striking
illustration. In such markets, the items offered are typically very close in characteristics,
and prices are high despite the presence of a large number of small sellers. The results
of the present article provide a simple interpretation. There is limited competition in
such markets because buyers do not shop around, expecting high prices and similar
products everywhere. This is reinforced by the high search costs for people on vacation,
who would rather spend their time on other activities. Our results further suggest that
there is a massive overentry problem. However, this problem is less acute the greater
11 ‘‘When price is the variable conjectured about, the non-collusive solution results in competitive
quantity . . . This last argument, previously identiﬁed exclusively with Joseph Bertrand was actually advanced
unambiguously by Fauveau sixteen years earlier.’’ (Ekelund and Hebert, 1990, p. 145).ANDERSON AND RENAULT / 731
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the degree of product differentiation, for example, stores in tourist areas that sell some-
what different goods. Thus we should expect some overentry and relatively high prices
for stores selling skiing gear in ski resorts, or swimsuits in sea resorts, but exacerbated
price and entry where restaurants specialize in a local speciality or where stores sell a
local delicacy or regional novelty (like berets in the Basque country).
Although tourist markets ﬁt particularly well into the present framework, there are
other types of very different markets with a high markup in spite of little differentiation
and a large number of sellers: Ausubel (1991) has documented (and casual empiricism
conﬁrms) that credit card interest rates are very sticky with respect to the underlying
cost of funds. He explicitly refers to search costs (along with switching costs and
consumer irrationality in imperfectly forecasting future borrowing) as a possible ex-
planation but argues against it on the ground that these costs would have to be unre-
alistically large to explain the observed markups. However, search costs may cause
major distortions in prices even if they are small (which is not the case for switching
costs). Since Ausubel’s study, credit card companies have advertised much more, even
sending preﬁlled applications to prospective cardholders. The rates on these cards are
very low, sometimes below 4% for an introductory period (the so-called teaser rates).
This is consistent with a large decline in search costs due to the advertisements. How-
ever, the fact that the rates typically rise substantially after six months or so suggests
a strong switching cost component.
As shown by the credit card example, the applicability of our analysis is limited
by several restrictions that may be important in some contexts. First, we have not
allowed ﬁrms to advertise the price or characteristics of their goods. In our ongoing
research, we are looking at the incentives that ﬁrms have to make consumers aware of
these features. Second, the model applies best under one-shot interactions, so there are
no reputations nor repeat purchases. A dynamic version of the model with repeated
interaction would be most welcome. Third, we have treated a parametric form of prod-
uct differentiation: we are working on endogenous choice of differentiation in a spa-
tially based model, with one driving force being the desire for little differentiation in
order to raise prices, as we have seen in the current model.
Finally, the following quote from Ekelund and Hebert (1995, p. 217) provides a
striking illustration of overentry resulting from search costs:
Consider Chadwick’s case for franchising funeral services for London, circa 1843. [See Edwin Chadwick,
1843.] He estimated that between 600 and 700 undertakers in London performed over 100 funerals per day.
Therefore, about six undertakers competed for each funeral. Thus the market situation appeared to be non-
collusive and roughly competitive; Chadwick alleged that the funeral suppliers acted like monopolies. They
could charge exorbitant prices because demanders were faced with high information and search costs when
shopping for a funeral supplier.
Appendix A
n Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst show that p* is increasing in c. Since x ˆ is decreasing in c, it sufﬁces
to show that (m/p*) is increasing in x ˆ. To this end, rewrite (m/p*) as
ˆ x n21 m
kn 21 5 f(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 2 nf 9(e)F(e) de. O E p* k50 2`
Taking the derivative with respect to x ˆ, we have
n21 9 m
k 2 k21 n21 (x ˆ) 5 (f9(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 1 kf(x ˆ) F(x ˆ)) 2 nf9(x ˆ)F(x ˆ). O 12 p* k50
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n21 n21 nn 21 n21 1 2 F(x ˆ)1 2 F(x ˆ)( n 2 1)F(x ˆ)
k k21 F(x ˆ) 5 and kF(x ˆ) 52 . OO 2 1 2 F(x ˆ)[ 1 2 F(x ˆ)] 1 2 F(x ˆ) k50 k50
Thus
2 n 9 m f9(x ˆ)[1 2 F(x ˆ)] 1 f(x ˆ)1 2 F(x ˆ)
n21 (x ˆ) 52 nF(x ˆ). 12 [] p*1 2 F(x ˆ)1 2 F(x ˆ)
The ﬁrst term is positive, since 1 2 F is logconcave on [a, b] and x ˆ Î [a, b]. The second term is equal
to F(x ˆ)k 2 nF(x ˆ)n21 5 [F(x ˆ)k 2 F(x ˆ)n21], which is clearly positive since 0 # F(x ˆ) # 1. Thus p*
n21 n21 oo k50 k50
is increasing in c.
To show that p* decreases with n, it sufﬁces to show that
ˆ ˆ x x nn 11 1 2 F(x ˆ)1 2 F(x ˆ)
n21 n f(x ˆ) 2 nf 9(e)F(e) de # f(x ˆ) 2 (n 1 1) f9(e)F(e) de. EE 1 2 F(x ˆ)1 2 F(x ˆ) 2` 2`
Since
ˆˆ xx
nn 2 n21 f9(e)F(e) de 5 f(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 2 nf (e) F(e) de, EE
2` 2`
it sufﬁces to show
ˆ x n 1 2 F(x ˆ)
n21 f(x ˆ) 2 nf 9(e)F(e) de E 1 2 F(x ˆ) 2`
ˆˆ xx n11 1 2 F(x ˆ)
nn 2 n21 # f(x ˆ) 2 nf 9(e)F(e) de 2 f(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 1 nf (e) F(e) de. EE 1 2 F(x ˆ) 2` 2`
The above inequality can be rewritten as
ˆ x
n212 0 # nF (e)[ f9(e)[1 2 F(e)] 1 f(e)]de, E
a
which holds since F(e) $ 0 and 1 2 F is logconcave on [a, b]. Thus p* is decreasing in n.
To prove (8), it is convenient to integrate by parts and rewrite p*a s
m
p* 5 . ˆ x n 1 2 F(x ˆ)
n212 n22 f(x ˆ) 2 nf(x ˆ)F(x ˆ) 1 n(n 2 1) f(e) F(e) de E 1 2 F(x ˆ) 2`
As c goes to zero, x ˆ goes to b. The ﬁrst two terms in the denominator can be written together as
[F(x ˆ)k 2 F(x ˆ)n], and since F(x ˆ) tends to one as x ˆ tends to b, the result follows.
n21 ok50
Finally, since c . 0, x ˆ , b and therefore, for all e Î [2`, x ˆ], 0 # F(e) , 1 and nF(e)n21 tends to zero
as n goes to inﬁnity. Furthermore, for n . [21/ln F(x ˆ)] and for all e Î [2`, x ˆ), (n 1 1)F(e)n # nF(e)n21.
Thus, from Lebesgue’s Monotone Convergence Theorem, the integral in the denominator of p* tends to zero
and the result follows. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
n On the existence of equilibrium. (1) Existence of equilibrium under monopolistic competition.
Proposition B1. If x ˆ $ a, 1 2 F is logconcave on [a, b] and there is an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms, then there
exists an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms charge a price equal toANDERSON AND RENAULT / 733
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m[1 2 F(x ˆ)]
p* 5 . mc f(x ˆ)
Proof. Since n is inﬁnite, the probability that a consumer samples all the ﬁrms is zero. Thus, if all other
ﬁrms are expected to charge some price p and ﬁrm i charges pi,ﬁ r mi’s demand is given by
l
D(p , p) 5 [1 2 F(x ˆ 1D )], i 1 2 F(x ˆ)
where l 5 L/n is the average market share. Since 1 2 F is logconcave on [a, b], D is logconcave in pi on
I 5 [p 1 m(a 2 x ˆ), p 1 m(b 2 x ˆ)]. For pi # p 1 m(a 2 x ˆ), ﬁrm i retains all consumers who sample it, so
its demand is perfectly inelastic and ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is linearly increasing in pi. For pi $ p 1 m(b 2 x ˆ), no
consumer stays with ﬁrm i and its proﬁt is zero. Thus, if a price maximizes ﬁrm i’s proﬁt on I, it maximizes
ﬁrm i’s proﬁt on R1. Since D is logconcave in pi on I, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is logconcave in pi on I, and therefore
its derivative is zero at some point only if that point corresponds to a maximum. Equation (9) is then obtained
by setting the proﬁt derivative to zero and imposing symmetry. Q.E.D.
N (2) Existence of equilibrium in oligopoly.
Proposition B2. For f logconcave and either of the following conditions, p* is an equilibrium price:
2f(b) 1 f9(b)[(b 2 x ˆ) 1 p*/m] $ 0; (i)
ˆ x ˜ 2f(x ˆ 1D ) ˜˜ [1 2 F(u 1D ) 1 f(u 1D )]f(u) du # 0, (ii) E ˜ f9(x ˆ 1D ) a
where is the unique solution to p*/m 15 [2f(x ˆ 1 )]/[f9(x ˆ 1 )]. ˜˜ ˜ ˜ DD D D
Proof. Without loss of generality, set L 5 1. First consider prices such that x ˆ 1D.b. This means that pi
is so high that any consumer purchasing from ﬁrm i has sampled all the other ﬁrms. From (5), ﬁrm i’s
demand in this case is given by
b
n21 D(p , p*) 5 F(e 2D ) f(e) de. i E
a
Hence the demand function coincides with that of Perloff and Salop (where consumers are perfectly informed)
for this range of prices. From the analysis in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), the corresponding proﬁt function
is quasi-concave under logconcavity of f. Moreover, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium price to
the Perloff-Salop model. Since the best response to a common price charged by competitors is positive at
zero and continuous, it must be below the 45-degree line for prices beyond the symmetric equilibrium price.
By Proposition 1, the symmetric equilibrium price for the model with positive search costs exceeds the
Perloff-Salop one, so proﬁt is decreasing for prices pi such that x ˆ 1D.b. Hence, we need to show that
proﬁt is quasi-concave for pi , p* 1 b 2 x ˆ.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne
n 11 2 F(x ˆ)
n21 D (p , p*) 5 [1 2 F(x ˆ 1D )] 2 nF(x ˆ) Ai [] n 1 2 F(x ˆ)
and D(pi, p*) 5 DA(pi, p*) 1 DB(pi, p*). Letting u 5 e 2Dand integrating (5) by parts yields
ˆ x
n21 n21 D (p , p*) 5 F(a 2D ) 1 [1 2 F(u 1D )] dF(u). Bi E
a2D
We now deﬁne pA(pi, p*) 5 piDA(pi, p*) and pB(pi, p*) 5 piDB(pi, p*), and we show that if pA is increasing
(concave), then pB is increasing (concave).
First suppose pA is increasing. Then 1 2 F(x ˆ 1D ) 2 (pi/m)f(x ˆ 1D ) $ 0. The derivative of
pB is F(a 2D )n21 1 1 2 F(u 1D ) 2 (pi/m)f(u 1D ) dF(u)n21. By logconcavity of 1 2 F, [1 2 F}/f
ˆ x #a2D
is decreasing so that the integrand is positive when pA is increasing. Thus pB is increasing.
Now suppose pA is concave, which implies that 22f(x ˆ 1D ) 2 (pi/m)f9(x ˆ 1D ) # 0. The second
derivative of pB is proportional to734 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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ˆ x
n22 n21 2pf (a)(n 2 1)f(a 2D )F(a 2D ) 2 2f(u 1D ) 1 (p /m)f9(u 1D ) dF(u). i E i
a2D
The ﬁrst term is negative. By logconcavity of f, f9/f is decreasing, so that pB is concave when pA is
concave. From these arguments, the proﬁt function is concave as long as the last inequality holds (since
proﬁt is the sum of two concave functions, pA and pB). The left-hand side of the inequality has the sign of
pf 9(x ˆ 1D ) i 22 2 ,
m f(x ˆ 1D )
which is negative if f9(x ˆ 1D ) $ 0. For f9(x ˆ 1D ) , 0, this expression is increasing in pi since f9/f is
decreasing by logconcavity of f. Hence if condition (i) holds, proﬁt is concave on [0, b 2 x ˆ 1 p*] and is
decreasing for higher prices, so that p* is the best response to p*.
Now suppose that (i) does not hold. Then there exists p ˜ 51 p* Î [0, b 2 x ˆ 1 p*], where is ˜˜ DD
deﬁned in the proposition. Note that pA is concave for pi , p ˜ and is convex and decreasing beyond p ˜. Since
pB is also concave for pi , p ˜, total proﬁt is concave up to p ˜ and is therefore quasi-concave on [0, b 2 x ˆ 1 p*]
as long as pB is decreasing at p ˜. This is equivalent to condition (ii) in the proposition. Q.E.D.
We give two corollaries to Proposition B2. The ﬁrst follows from inspection of condition (i).
Corollary B1. For f logconcave with f9 $ 0o n[ a, b], p* is the unique symmetric equilibrium price.
Corollary B2. For f logconcave and for 2f(a) $ 2f9(b)/f(b), p* is the unique symmetric equilibrium price.
Proof. By logconcavity of 1 2 F, 1/f(a) is an upper bound on the ﬁrst term of the integrand in condition
(ii), while logconcavity of f implies that 2f(b)/f9(b) is an upper bound on the second term. Thus the condition
in Corollary B2 guarantees that the integrand is always negative and therefore ensures condition (ii). Q.E.D.
Corollary B2 holds when f is exponentially decreasing. Another way to think about condition (ii) is
that the hazard rate, f/(1 2 F), should not increase too quickly (it is constant for f exponentially decreasing).
The condition of Corollary B2 holds with equality for F(x) 5 [(1 2 e2x)/(1 1 e2x)] for x $ 0, which is the
logistic distribution truncated below zero. In this case f(0) 5 ½ while f9/f tends to 21a sx tends to inﬁnity.
A family of distribution functions covered by Corollaries B1 and B2 is F(x) 5 xg, with g . 0 and
[a, b] 5 [0, 1]. The density functions for this family are logconcave since f(x) 5 gxg21 is loglinear. For
g $ 1, f9 is nonnegative on [0, 1], so Corollary B1 applies. For g , 1, f(0) is inﬁnite whereas f9(1)/f(1)
is ﬁnite, so Corollary B2 holds.
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